Notice Requirements in Modification of Alimony Proceedings by Nelson, Theodore R. & Schulman, Irving
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
10-1-1954
Notice Requirements in Modification of Alimony
Proceedings
Theodore R. Nelson
Irving Schulman
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Theodore R. Nelson and Irving Schulman, Notice Requirements in Modification of Alimony Proceedings, 9 U. Miami L. Rev. 41 (1954)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol9/iss1/5
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS. IN MODIFICATION OF
ALIMONY PROCEEDINGS
THEODORE R. NELSOg
and
IRVING SCHULMAN e
INTRODUCTION
A frequent problem for many Florida practitioners is the question of the
modification of Florida chancery decrees relating to, or providing for, the
continuation or reduction of alimony paymeass by husbands. However, it is
the intention of these writers to limit this discussion to the question of
the notice requred to be given by an applicam 6or modification to the re-
spondent, where such respondent has removed himself from this state or is
not and never was a resident of it.
The general provisions for the procedure in-the modification of alimony
appear in the Florida Statutes,, and bear repetition and study here:
Whenever any husband and wife heretofore, or hereafter, shall have
entered any agreement providing for the payments for, or in lieu
of, separate support, maintenance or alimony, whether in connec-
tion with any action for divorce or separate maintame, or with
any voluntary property settlement, or whenever any htsnd has
pursuant to the decree of. any court of competent jurisdiction been
required to make to his wife any such payments, and The drcum-
stances of the p:arties or the financial ability of the husband shall
have been changed since the execution of such agreement, or the
rendition of such decree, either party may apply to the circuit
court of the circuit in which the parties, or either of them, shall
have resided at the date of the execution of such agreement, or
shall reside at the date of such application, or in which such a-
greement shall have been executed, or in which such decree shall
have been rendered, for an order and judgment decreasing or in-
creasing the amount of such separate support, maintenance or ali-
mony, and the court, after giving bath parties an opportunity to be
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Bar Association.
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1. § 65.15 (1951).
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heard, and to introduce evidence relevant to the issue, shall make
such order and judgment as justice and equity shall require, with
due regard to the changed circumstances and the financial ability
of the husband, decreasing or increasing or confirming the amount
of separate support, maintenance or alimony provided for in such
agreement, or in such decree....
Eliminating any reference here to the enforcement provisions of the
statute, which follow the foregoing, the statute then continues, signifi-
cantly:
This section is declaratory of existing public policy and laws of
this State, which is hereby affirmed and confirmed in conformance
with the provisions hereof, and it shall be the duty of the Judges
of the Circuit Courts of this State to construe liberally the pro-
visions hereof in order to effect the objects and purposes hereof
and the public policy of the State as hereby declared. (Emphasis
supplied).
The problem can be stated succinctly in the following hypothetical situa-
tion. Husband, H, and wife, W, both formerly New York residents, execute a
property settlement and separation agreement, providing for the payment of
permanent alimony in the sum of thirty-five dollars per week to W. She
establishes a Florida residence and sues for divorce. H appears through a
Florida attorney and eventually a final decree is entered granting W her
divorce and approving the agreement. Some time later W leaves Florida for
another domicile. Years pass. While H has become wealthy W has growi
old and sickly. She returns to Florida for a short visit and upon arrival files
a petition before the same court which entered the final decree years be-
fore, setting forth the grounds of her plea for an increase. But U is and al-
ways has been a New York resident. True, he appeared generally in the
original proceeding. Now, however, she cannot serve him with personal
process in Florida, and he is not likely to make another voluntary general
appearance. As a result, she resorts to a statutory "Notice by Publica-
tion," variously known as "Order for Publication" and a "Notice to De-
fend," under the provisions of the Florida Statutes,2 which provide for the
use ot substituted service by publication. The clerk of the court, at her re-
quest, mails a carbon copy of the petition and notice to H, receiving back a
return receipt.
Has "due process" been satisfied? After all, W is trying to obtain an
increase in the payments due her under an order which is probably entitled
"Final Decree of Divorce." Is this not tantamount to an initial suit for new
monies, and therefore contrary to the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Nell?'
2. c. 48 (1951).
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
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This question, and the reverse situation, where the husband requests a
reduction of alimony under similar circumstances, has caused not a little
concern and'confusion, and has further caused the Supreme Court of Florida
to tacitly reverse itself ihi recent years.
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Ancillary Proceedings, notice. In 1942, the Supreme Court of Florida de-
cided, in Cohn v. Cobn,4 what is apparently the controlling opinion on the
subject in this State; that a proceeding for modification was an "ancillary
proceeding," that is, ancillary to the original case for divorce or separate
maintenance. The impression was given that an applicant for modification
could always come before the same circuit court which rendered the final
decree, and by pleading the requisites outlined in the statute, and sending
the respondent the simplest sort of notice of hearing, such as by mail, that
such ,circuit court wouldi then assume (or re-assume) jurisdiction of the
matter, and the litigation could proceed on the merits.
In earlier years, in the Norton case, the same court had held that ser-
vice by publication in a modification action was insufficient., In this latter
holding, it should be noted that the final decree originally entered between
the parties did not specifically retain jurisdiction as to the question of ali-
mony. However, the statute on modification does not require such retention
of jurisdiction, and is probably intended to take care of those cases where
such retention is not present.' Nor, for that matter, does such statute pro-
vide for the manner or method of service on or notice to the respondent.
Where a final decree specifically retains jurisdiction as to alimony,
either party thereunder can probably re-enter the same original proceeding
as well as the same court, without the necessity of filing a new action.'
An understanding of the facts in each of the pertinent cases on the sub-
ject is essential to an understanding of the application of the legal princi-
ples involved. In the Norton case, the respondent had filed a motion to dis-
miss, under the Rules of Chancery then in force,' which the court held to be
a general appearance that cured an otherwise defective service. Although
not essential to the decision in that case, Justice Trammel added as dic-
tum:
Petitioner... may only proceed with the cause after service ot
process on the respondent, or after the voluntary appearance of
respondent.'
4. 151 Fla. 589, 10 So.2d 77 (1942).
5. Norton v. Norton, 131 Fla. 219, 179 So. 414 (1938).
6. Cf. Haynes v. Haynes, 40 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1949); Van Loon v. Van Loon, 132
Fla. 535, 182 So. 208 (1938).
7. Cf. Gaffay v. Gaffny, 129 Fla. 172, 176 So. 68 (1937) (where such jurisdiction
was retained); McSherry v. McSherry, 113 Md. 395, 77 Atl. 653 (1910).
8. FLA. STAT. § 63:33 (1951).
9. Norton v. Norton, 131 Fla. 219, 227, 179 So. 414, 418 (1938).
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in referring to "service of process", the court clearly was not including in
its dictum a substituted service.
The Cobn case then appeared to reverse the dictum of the Norton case.
Mrs. Cohn had acquired a final decree of divorce in Florida, with alimony
provisions, in a case where her husband had made a written appearance.
She later acquired a New York domicile, which in her husband's case had
never been relinquished. Subsequently, as an acknowledged New York resi-
dent, Mr. Cohn applied for a reduction of the alimony provisions in the same
Florida circuit court where the original decree was entered. The alimony
provisions in such decree were in the form of confirmation of an agreement
of the parties relating thereto, and incorporated therein. Mr. Cohn published
a "Notice by Publication" addressed to his wife, of the pendency of the
inew" action, giving her a set time within'which to appear and contest
or have a default entered against her. Mrs. Cohn then filed a special ap-
pearance for the sole purpose of moving to quash the attempted substituted
service. She may have been mailed a copy of the proceedings by the clerk
of the court, but this fact was not mentioned in the report of the case. The
Supreme Court of Florida, in affirming the circuit court's denial of the said
motion, held the husband's action, although it had all the accoutrements of
a new suit, to be an ancillary proceeding, and added some phraseology that
is of great interest:
A binding res being within the jurisdiction of the Court, service of
notice by publication is authorized.., the non-resident defendant
having appeared, though specially, has notice of the application
made under the statute in force when the alimony decree was ren-
dered at her suit in which the husband appeared. (Emphasis sup-
plied). -°
The court tried only half-heartedly to avoid an open break with the Norton
dictum. But were they not going farther than the facts warranted, and hold-
ing, in effect, that substituted service was always authorized in modifica-
tion proceedings, regardless of whether brought by"husband or wife? True,
Justice Whitfield made the distinction between the Cohn case andthe
Norton case by stating, in the former:
The respondent (in the Norton case) appeared in the cause and the
Court did not have occasion to decide that in such cases as this
seeking a reduction of alimony decreed and agreed, service of
process on the respondent must be personal and not by publica-
tion when the respondent is a non-resident of Florida. (Emphasis
supplied)."
Justice Whitfield, in referring to "such cases as this seeking a reduction
of alimony decreed and agreed," was plainly referring only to the Cohn
case, because in the Norton case, Mrs. Norton was the applicant and was
10. Cohn v. Cohn, 151 Fla. 549, 557, 10 So.2d 77, 81 (1942).
1I. Ibid.
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seeking an increase. Was the Justice therefore limiting his decision to ap-
plication for reduction, steering clear of Pennoyer v. Neffand leaving that
for a future court decision?
If he was thus limiting his opinion, was the "binding res," of such a
continuing nature that the court does not lose the jurisdiction not specific-
ally reserved under its own decree? Such res can only be the narital union
itself, including the parties thereto ind all the facets of its institution and
disolution.
The Florida cases are silent on the specific subject of notice until the
Pasquier case, 2 in 1951. At that time, the Supreme Court affirmed a de-
cision of the Dade County Circuit Court, without opinion, in denying cer-
tiorari to a respondent husband under circumstances almost identical to
those of the Norton case. Mrs. Pasquier, an acknowledged New York resi-
dent, applied for an increase in alimony. The original decree had been ren-
dered by the same circuit court where the new application was filed, and in
the original proceeding a decree affirmed and approved the provisions of an
agreement between the parties. The husband made a general appearance in
the original proceeding. Many years passed, when she filed her petition
alleging that she was poor and ailing while her husbaod had, on the con-
trary, acquired large wealth. A "Notice by Publication" was issued, and a
copy mailed the husband by registered mail. He appeared specially and
filed a motion to quash, largely in the same form as in the Cohn case. lif
counsel argued that P ennoyer v. Neff, controlled, as this was an action "on
a money demand."" The logic of this argument, and its attempt to distin-
guish the case from the Cobn case, lay in the fact that here at- .ttempc to
increase rather than to decrease alimony was asked. But Cobn v. Cobn was
successfully quoted again, to the effect that there was here "not an orig-
inal suit for alimony but.., an application by ancillary proceedings under
(Chapter 65.15) the act of 1935.""
Thus it may be seen how an evolutionary process of thinking evolved on
this subject in the Supreme Court of Florida. But the unfortunate absence
of a written opinion in the Pasquier case leaves the issues partially unre-
solved -in that forum.
Since it is partially unresolved, it becomes necessary to question how
the present court would hold on a case on all fours with the Pasquier case.
In connection therewith, the further question arises as to whether the word
"modify" in the statute is inclusive of both reduction and increase of ali-
mony. Words and Phrases s attempts to define the elusive term, as does
Ballantine's LawDictionary," the latter citing a case"that terms it "the
12. Parczewski v. Parczewski (Pasquier), 51 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1950) (Decision.
rendered by Hon. Marshall C. iseheart, Circuit Judge, Dade County, Florida, in
which one of the authors was counsel for the petitioning wife).
13. Brief for Appellants, p. 2.
14. Cohn v. Cohn, 151 Fla. 549, 556, 10 So.2d 77, 81 (1942).
15. 27 WORDS AND PHRASES 425.
16. BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 827 (2d ed. 1948).
17. State v. Tucker, 36 Or. 291, 61 Pac. 894 (1900).
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power to change or vary in some particulars an already created or legally
existing thing." It has been defined also as "to alter, to change incidental
or subordinate features; enlarge, extend, limit, reduce."", More pointedly,
an Iowa court has held that "the statutory power of the Industrial Commiss-
ion to modify an arbitration award is the power to change the award, thus
to increase as well as reduce it."'' Finally, the California courts have
held that under the code of that state, providing that the court may award
alimony to the wife where the divorce is granted for offense of the husband,
and may from time to time modify its orders in such respect, the word
"modify"includes both the increase and decrease of such alimony'award.10
It will be noted that none of the foregoing citations involves the issue of
notice to a respondent in an ancillary proceeding for modification. In none
of these cases was such an issue litigated.
Probably because of considerations of public policy, many courts have
long held that where questions of custody and support of children are in-
volved the court has jurisdiction to hear the application as part of the
original proceeding.-
The authors of an American Law Reports, comment have speculated at
length upon the comparison of notice requirements in child support cases
and in alimony caqes.2' Part of this speculation is very much in point here,
and is quoted accordingly:
Perhaps the doctrine of these cases may, technically at least, be
applied by analogy to the modification of a decree as to the a-
mount of installments of alimony payable thereunder, since in
each instance the original decree is essentially of a provisional
or interlocutory nature, subject to change as the circumstances
may require, and in each instance the proceedings for modifica-
tion... are merely ancillary... and in each case it may be argued
that the jurisdiction acquired in thd divorce proceedings over the
complaining party furnishes the scintilla of jurisdiction necessary
for the modification of the decree, without further personal notice
to him within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court.1'
A case very similar to the Cohn case arose in the State of Arkansas.4
18. Smith v. Ray, 149 Ohio St. 394, 79 N.E. 2d 116 (1948). We find, however,
that "the court's statutory power to modify alimony allowances includes the right
finally to terminate alimony payments previously ordered." Gebhardt v. Gebhardr,
69 Cal. App.2d 723, 160 P.2d 177 (1945).
19. Jarman v. Collins-Holt Lumber and Coal Co., 226 Iowa 1247, 286 N.W. 526(1939).
20. Soule v. Soule, 4 Cal. App. 97, 87 Pac. 205 (1906).
21. Cowles v. Cowles, 80 N.H. 530, 120 Ad. 76 (1923) (The court said: "Since
jurisdiction is- determined by the state of facts existing at the time of filing, a
petition and when once attached is not defeated by subsequent qcts of the parties
not by their removal out of the jurisdiction, on a petition to modify a decree for
support of children the.. .court had jurisdiction to hear the application as part of
the original proceeding.").
22. 70 A.L.R. 526.
23. Id. at 527.
24. Schley v. Dodge, 206 Ark. 1151, 178 S.W. 2d 851 (1941) (commented on favor-
ably in 2 NELSON ON DIVORCE 469 2d ed. 1945).
1i.IMONY PROCEEI)JNGS
In that instance, both parties to the original divorce-alimony action in
Arkansas had become non-residents of Arkansas. The wife filed an ap-
plication for a writ of prohibition against the Arkansas Chancellor's pro-
ceeding further on the husband's petition to modify alimony payments. She
admitted actual notice of the petition, but entered a special appearance,
since she could not be served within the jurisdictional limits. An Arkansas
statute quoted in the case provides that the court, upon application of
either party; may make such alterations from time to time as to the allow-
ance of alimony and maintenance, as may be proper. The court there noted
that its statutes did not prescribe the method of service, though the re-
spondent had complained that her ex-husband had not taken the proper
steps for constructive service on her. The court said:
The notice need only be such as is reasonable calculated to give
the opposite party knowledge of the proceeding an opportunity to
be heard.-
Analogy to the instant problem may be drawn to the procedure of most
states in allowing for enforcement of an alimony decree against a non-res-
ident husband, where he was a party to the original proceedings. The past
due payments accrue to a point where the wife seeks to reduce them to
judgment. New York, for example, directs the wife to serve him with copies
of the Order to Show Cause "by such notice.. as the court may direct.26
In one case, the New York wife moved to collect nine thousand three
hundred seventy dollars ($9,370.00) from her errant husband, then resident
in Vermont.- The wife cited a former case with good effect, which stated:
Due process does not require that personal service shall be made
upon a party where the proceeding is only a continuation of liti-
gation which is already within the jurisdiction of the court."
The same court held that a final judgment does not terminate a matrimonial
action where there is a provision for alimony, the court's jurisdiction re-
mains unimpaired and the defendant remains subject to its mandates.
The case of Schley v. Dodge" has been commented upon favorably in
Nelson on Oivorce.-1" The author of that volume stated:
If (as is the case in most States) the proceeding to modify is
merely incidental to the original suit, and there is no specific
provision as to the manner of service of such an application on a
nonresident over whom the Court had personal jurisdiction at the
time of making the award, it would appear that the Court could
properly direct service of notice of such application by any method
25. Commented on favorably in Divorce, 27 C.J.S. 1094.
26. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 1171-b.
27. Cukor v. Cukor, 114 Vt. 456, 49 A.2d 206 (1946).
28. Id. at 209.
29. 206 Ark,.1151, 178 S. .2d 851 (1941),
30. 2 NELSON ON DIVORCE 469 (2d ed. 1945).
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reasonably calculated to provide notice, and if it appears that the
party in question had actual notice, he or she will be bound.."
Some courts. have gone so far as to allow notice, in certain ancillary pro-
ceedings, on the attorney for the husband in the original proceeding, in the
absence of an affirmative showing that the attorney was unauthorized to rep-
resent the husband further 31 However, no court has gone so far as to say
that where there was no provision in the original decree of divorce for ali-
mony, although the husband was personally served, the wife may then pro-
ceed to obtain an alimony decree in a "modification" proceeding."
CONCLUSION
The question of due process under the federal and state constitutions
is implicit throughout this discussion. Although most of the cases in point
have taken this for granted, some courts have gone more fully into the sub-
ject. One has held:
... the notice required to be given a defendant under the due pro-
cess clause of the Federal constitution, is referable only to the
commencement of an action or suit, and to an opportunity to be
heard on any material question which shall arise during the prose-
cution of the action or suit.'4
Let us grant, for the sake of argument, returning to Mrs. Pasquier, that the
Florida modification statute does contemplate the hypothetical situation
originally proposed, and answers the same in the affirmative as to the
wife's right to apply for an increase in alimony and serve notice of such
proceeding on her nonresident husband by means other than personal ser-
vice of process. Will the courts of the state in which the husband is resi-
dent recognize and enforce the increased amounts contained in the ancillary
decree, as they would the original alimony decree if he should fail or re-
fuse to make a general appearance in the Florida proceeding? The New
York Court was never called on in either the Cohn case or the Pasquier
case, to squarely decide that issue. At least, research of the reports of
that state reveal no such action there.
31. Ibid.
32. State ex rel. Groves v. First Judicial District Court of Ormsby County, 61
Nev. 269, 125 P.2d 723 (1942). "It has been declared to be the prevailing rule that
courts will not concern themselves so much with the manner of giving notice, as
with the reasonableness under the circumstances of the particular case." Cf.
Iiuehler v. Buchler, 329 Ill. App. 239, 67 N.E.2d 708 (1946).
33. 168 A.L.R, 232, the following statement is interesting: "The question whether
a court which upon personal service of process upon the defendant-husband has
rendered a divorce decree without providing for alimony, may subsequently render a
decree of alimony, against him without personal service of process, is analogous to
the question.. .but it does not frequendy arise, since it is generally settled that
in the absence of a statute to the contrary or a reservation in a divorce decree, a
decree which does not provide for alimony precludes the wife from subsequently
recovering alimony with or without personal service." McSherry v. McSherry, 113
Md. 395, 77 Atl. 653 (1910).
34. Reale v. Judges of Superior Court, 265 Mass. 135, 163 N.E. 893, 897 (1928).
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However, if the hypothetical wife were denied the right to apply for an
increase in alimony under the statute, where she could no longer obtain
personal service of process on her husband in Florida, would this not
have the effect of closing the only door open to her for accomplishment of
this purpose? A. L. Sainer, in his work, The Substantive Law of New
York, states:
It would seem that the Supreme Court (of New York) has no power
to increase the award of alimony made by a decree of a sister
state.3 '
Thus it would also seem that the element of public policy and the sharp
blade of logic are working a gradual transformation of theory from the un-
bending viewpoint of the Norton case to the relative liberality of the
Pasquier holding. It should not be long before the Supreme Court of Florida
is presented the issue squarely once again, and is called upon to write its
opinion on the subject and give its full and.final views on the question.
Meanwhile, it would seem a fair risk for Florida counselors to bring modi-
fication actions under circumstances similar to that of the Cohn and Pas-
quier disputes, with the pious hope that after a motion to quash is denied
the respondent will make a general appearance for purposes of contest and
never be able thereafter to harp back to the question of lack of jurisdiction.
35. SAINER, SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF NEW YORK 231, citing Moen v. Thompson,
186 Misc. 647, 61 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
